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Abstract     
Outer space first came into the spotlight after the second half of the XX century. Nevertheless, 
its problem is rooted deeper and covers a wider chronology: outer space does not only affect 
the atmosphere and beyond, but also our planet and the human being itself, including our own 
past, present and future. The objective of this coursework is to realize an approach to the 
ethical, political and moral problems that raise our relationship with outer space from different 
perspectives. Considering this approach, a critique of the hegemonic conception of nature will 
be necessary, as well as an outline of different alternatives to this conception.  
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Resum    
L’espai exterior pren importància a la darrera meitat del segle XX. El seu problema, però, 
posseeix unes arrels més profundes i una cronologia més llunyana:  no només afecta allò més 
enllà de l’atmosfera, sinó també el nostre planeta i l’ésser humà, inclosos el seu passat, present 
i futur. Aquest treball té com a objectiu realitzar una aproximació als problemes ètics, polítics 
i morals que planteja la nostra relació amb l’espai exterior des de diverses perspectives. Partint 
d’aquesta aproximació, es farà necessària una crítica de la concepció hegemònica de la natura, 
així com un esbós de diferents alternatives a aquesta.  
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“You won’t set foot on the moon, unless you learn how to manage the Earth”	
A banner in a demonstration in Barcelona, 2016. 
 
1.  Introduction 
In 1958, Hannah Arendt, in the prologue of the Human Condition, described the launching of 
the Sputnik satellite in 1957 as an historic event for the human species and our relationship 
with the planet, it was – in her words– “second in importance to no other, not even to the 
splitting of the atom”. The launching of the first satellite expressed, according to Arendt, the 
desire to escape Earth: it was the colossal expression of a rebellion –nowadays on course– 
against our own human condition, deeply rooted on Earth (Macauley, 1996: 104). It is this 
rebellion developed in outer space –which Arendt mentioned back in the late fifties–  the main 
object of interest of this article. If we consider that our current relationship with outer space is 
more than a mere scientific investigation area, there are a lot of ethical and political questions 
that arise, like “Should we abandon our planet to search a new inhabitable one?” or “Why 
should we spend so much money on space research”, which I will try to analyse to understand 
better the motives and interests that lie behind them.  
In order to do so I will mainly use philosophical bibliography, predominantly from the 
environmental ethics discipline. However, I will also refer to Heidegger’s critique to the 
contemporary concept of nature and, when necessary, I will examine selected social science 
bibliography as well. The outer space has been a major theme in the natural sciences area, but 
in philosophy, the social sciences and humanities, the bibliography available is relatively scarce 
and sparse.  
The main objective of this article, then, will be to analyse our relationship with outer space and 
–in pursuance to conduct this inquiry– I will firstly focus on our ethical relationship with it: 
both as a scientific object and as a place where we can perform ethical actions. Since these 
actions are quintessentially human – and subsequently, political too– I will try to examine the 
discourse that legitimates and sorts these actions (including research) as appropriate or 
inapplicable, as valid or unfounded.  Finally, I will attempt to explain why the main causes of 
this discourse, where our ethical actions are embedded, may not be found beyond our planet’s 




2. The ethics of outer space 
On the 22nd February 2017, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
offered a press conference in which announced the discovery of a planetary system, named 
TRAPPIST-1(NASA, 2017a), composed by seven earth-sized planets. Three of them were said 
to be rocky, with a hydrogen-dominated atmosphere, tidally locked, but most importantly: 
within a habitable zone. A triad of planets, perhaps capable of sustaining life, which became 
instantly cherished and celebrated by the scientific community, the media and the public 
opinion. But why were they so important? These planets were supposed to be about 40 light-
years from Earth (378.4 billion kilometres), however they were mostly celebrated as a probable 
place where we could reach within the next decades or at last in a few centuries. This rejoicing 
atmosphere, led NASA to unveil a retro-styled poster (NASA, 2017b) titled: Planet Hop from 
TRAPPIST-1e: voted best “hab zone” vacation within 12 parsecs from Earth. We can see there 
a family discovering, looking through a window, what seems to be a distant landscape with six 
moons in the sky. 
There is no doubt that this discovery was of an enormous scientific relevance: planets that 
reassemble ours in their physical conditions are perfect objects to study the behaviour of our 
own atmosphere or lithosphere, for example, and given the specific circumstances they might 
be home to life as well. Nevertheless, I think we should assume that the global attention set on 
this issue did not obey these scientific criteria of research. Even when these remote planets are 
unreachable, as a one-way trip on the fastest spaceship available today would take about 
817.000 years (Weitering, 2017), the chance of them being a future home was in the spotlight. 
Three possible home planets, that like those wishes that grants the genie of the lamp, persist 
only in the geography of fiction and in NASA’s poster.  
However, there are several questions that arise from the fact that these planets were mostly 
celebrated for their capability of sustaining human life, but in this essay, I will focus in the 
ethical and political ones. In regard of the ethical dimension of outer space, we can divide these 
questions into two possible groups: one in which we discuss the ethical problems of outer space 
itself (a genuine ethics of outer space), and another where we discuss the ethical problems of 
the research of outer space (an ethics of the scientific research of space). Questions such as 
"Does space has value for itself?", "Is space an environment?" or "Should we modify other 
planets so we could inhabit them?" would fall into the first group; while if we ask, "How should 
we spend money in outer space research?" or " Should we send humans to space or just 
unmanned missions?" we would therefore be in the second group. A genuine ethics of outer 
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space requires scientific knowledge about space so its answers can be formulated solidly. On 
the other hand, an ethics of the scientific research of space demands a profound insight on the 
relationship between science and society. There is a third type of questions that emerge from 
the tension between these two groups: those that consider outer space a problem for the Earth 
itself and its environment, for example, "Why would we need to inhabit other planets different 
from Earth?" or "If the Earth is not the only place where humans can live, can we treat it as a 
disposable resource?". 
In the next two sections I will develop further on the two categories of ethical problems that 
emerge from the first two types of questions: a genuine ethics of outer space and an ethics of 
scientific research of space. Then, I will comment on why a new sort of problems regarding 
Earth cannot be classified neither in the first group nor in the second one and, finally, I will 
argue that we should consider them a part of the environmental ethics discipline.  
2.1 A genuine ethics of outer space	
Given that space is a place much devoid of life, an ethics which makes space its object of 
thought must take some questions regarding its value and nature into consideration. Such 
inquiries have mostly escaped the philosophic reflection as they have been transferred to the 
physics and astrophysics experts’ opinion. But these questions are not scientific ones, so their 
answers should not be scientific but moral or political. In this section I will review a few 
exceptions to this kind of oblivion. Firstly, I will comment on the article Is space an 
environment? by the Finnish philosopher Saara Reiman (Reiman, 2009), from the department 
of Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, who has deeply thought about 
the nature of space, mainly trying to answer whether we should apply to outer space the values 
we find on the terrestrial environment or not. After that I will focus on James Schwartz, an 
American philosopher of science, from the Wichita State University (Kansas), who has tried to 
draw the first outline of an ethical theory of outer space (Schwartz, 2011). 
Both Reiman and Schwartz are analytical philosophers greatly inspired by Holmes Rolston III 
Environmental Ethics theory, where he defends –among others– a pluralism of values rather 
than a unique supervalue that forces us to preserve our environment. This means that we can 
definitely find in the environment an economic value, but not only: scientific, historical, 
aesthetic, and character-building values, for example, are to be found as well, and there is no 
ultimate hierarchy which classifies or grades them.  
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This concept of plurality of values is what Saara Reiman deeply explores in her article applied 
to space. Given that our actions’ consequences are expanding their Earth-bound sphere of 
influence, a lot of new questions are to emerge as well: “Do we need to worry about the moral 
implications of our actions in the vastness of space?” or “What kind of explorers will we be - 
and what kind of explorers should we be?” (Reiman, 2009: 81); as Reiman points out, these 
questions will not be solved by the acquisition of more scientific knowledge alone but by the 
development of an ethical theory that examines the moral status of outer space as well. 
Regarding this moral status, the issue which is raised in this article is whether we should 
consider outer space an environment or not.  After exploring a variety of plausible scenarios 
and hypothesis, Reiman concludes offering an ambiguous answer to the question about the 
moral status outer space should enjoy: “space at large should not enjoy a moral status equal to 
Earth. However, some environmental ethical viewpoints are still important”. This different 
moral status makes environmental ethics theories not entirely valid nor applicable to outer 
space: a new ethical theory of space – believes Reiman– should be built from some of its 
principles re-examined.  
On the other hand, James Schwartz, one of the pioneers in the philosophic reflection of outer 
space, has defended in an article titled What is Philosophy of Space Exploration? (Schwartz, 
2015a) that some of the current environmental ethics values should be applied to space, but 
given the lack of scientific knowledge we found ourselves lost in, we do not really know yet 
which ones will play an important role and which ones will not. He argues that “only after we 
have gained more knowledge about space and developed more proposals we can begin, in a 
systematic and principled way, to theorize about judgement in space.”. Thus, there is a lack of 
scientific knowledge that needs to be fulfilled to theorize about the moral status of outer space. 
This necessity of increasing scientific research, which is the only way to gain this kind of 
knowledge, is what I will explore in the next section. 
2.2 An ethics of the scientific research of space	
We have seen in the last section that more scientific knowledge is generally said to be required 
to theorize about the moral status of outer space.  This prerequisite requires a justification as 
well: why should there be even more scientific research of outer space? And, in case there is, 
should this research be theoretical or perhaps one based in enormous spaceships driven by 
humans and footprints on the soil of the moon? These questions that arise entail a serious 
justification not merely based on science, but on socio-economic restrictions and technical and 
moral limits as well. 
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A philosophical approach to this question has been extensively done by the philosopher of 
science James Schwartz in the article Our Moral Obligation to Support Space Exploration 
(Schwartz, 2011), where the author tries to make an argument to justify the funding and the 
continuity of the space program: this argument is based on three different sub-arguments that 
though driven through different pathways lead to the same place: we should support space 
exploration “from our obligation to protect the environment and survive as a species”. Why 
should we? Schwartz argues there are at least three important reasons that should make us 
invest money to this kind of programs: first, there is a necessity of securing resources which 
our planet does not possess in enough quantities; second, we need more space technology in 
order to contest a possible extra-terrestrial meteorite menace; and lastly, we are obligated “to 
pursue interstellar colonization in order to ensure long-term human survival”.   
These are the three main arguments we can see through all the bibliography (constituted 
primarily by natural scientists) that support space exploration funding. (Schwartz, 2015b) 
Bearing in mind that science is not a neutral object or knowledge, but a social construct in 
which the scientific method is applied (Chiriguini, 1999), we ought to know which are the 
social motives or cultural preconceptions which upkeep and sustain these arguments. An 
examination of these presumptions cannot be roofed with a genuine ethics of space nor with an 
ethics of the scientific research of outer space: “Why should we abandon our planet?” or “Is it 
there a necessity of extra-terrestrial resources?” are questions in which our planet, considered 
as a unique home must be taken into consideration: we are not speaking about space any longer, 
but about the Earth and its environmental boundaries.  
To sum up, the three arguments James Schwartz claims should oblige us to support space 
exploration are the same arguments that lead us to believe we should consider moving to 
another planet, or at least, having one in storage. Of course, there are threats that are extra-
terrestrial and should be considered in the long-term, such as a solar flame burnout or a 
meteorite impact; however, I doubt this requires space exploration alone, but scientific research 
in all its forms as such problems would require a holistic, diverse and profound approach. These 
extra-terrestrial problems then, are not human caused nor can be solved by social, cultural or 
economic change. But there is one that could be: the resource problem. Schwartz does not only 
consider all these problems as non-human related but he also tries to solve them all by exploring 
the space to find other planets that could be inhabitable, or at least exploitable. We see a major 
problem here and we feel that this problem cannot be discussed anymore as a one that regards 
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solely the ethos of science, but as a social and cultural one which inevitably leads to the 
relationship between the human species and the environment surrounding it.   
 
3. The abandonment of Earth. An environmental ethics problem. 
We have already seen some of the questions that arise when we ask ourselves about outer space; 
we have classified them, generalizing, between questions which their answer imply a genuine 
ethics of outer space, such as “Is outer space an environment?” and those that inquiry into the 
spirit of the science of outer space, for example: “Should we send humans to space or just 
unmanned missions?”. 
However, there are a few questions regarding outer space which do not fit in neither one of 
these categories. For example, “Why should we leave Earth to colonize other planets?” or “Do 
other planets contain needed resources that are not to be found on Earth?”. These questions are 
only understandable from a social context of deep ecological crisis where the hegemonic logics 
alert almost every day about the lack of resources our planet suffers from. I will discuss in the 
next few pages that this is an interested point of view and not an absolute fact as it is intended 
to be.   
Furthermore, in this section, as the environment takes a fundamental relevance for the analysis 
of these questions, I will be dialoguing outer space with a branch of philosophy that has made 
the environment and our relationship with it its object of thought: the environmental ethics 
discipline.  
3.1 The resource problem 
It goes without saying that the resource problem we face is one of the main arguments used to 
justify the discovery of other planets. It is important to notice that this kind of encounter would 
produce a dual reification of either this new planet (which would be considered as a means 
only) or of the Earth, as our future next home would probably make us contemplate our current 
one as a disposable container of resources. The eyes who scrutinise the night sky through the 
lens of a telescope trying to come across with a singularity that solves all its problems, often 
forget they are standing on this singularity: the home, oikos, where we live. 
Oikos is an ancient Greek word (οἶκος) that refers to family, the family’s property, and the 
house. This is important, as two contemporary words are formed by it: economy and ecology. 
Economy is the administration of the house, and ecology, its science [of the house]. Both have 
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theoretically in common their object of study, this unicum we dwell in, but we can see that this 
is no longer true when not speaking about grammar: economy and ecology have been 
discursively separated for a long time. This dissociation has a lot to do with the resource 
problem in such a way that some consider it the justification of exploring space. 
Although I will not primarily discuss here the necessity of growth the capitalist economy has 
in its beating core (Kallis, 2017), in the next few lines I will be using some arguments that 
imply that, at least, our current economic system classifies growing as a good thing and not 
growing a not so good one. Regarding the fact that there is, or it is possible that there will be, 
a lack of resources if things remain structurally similar as they are now, we can formulate this 
scarcity as a relational statement: if there is a lack or a surplus of resources it is only related to 
how much of them we spend and in which rate. We must be clear then and add a conditional 
that changes it all: if the current way of producing and consuming does not change, there will 
be a lack of resources. Resources do not lack per se: the Earth is not getting any smaller year 
by year but our appetite and population growing larger. This almost obvious statement is 
significant, as the hegemonic common sense sometimes tries to close the possibilities labelling 
as impossible those things that, in fact, would imply a structural and radical change and 
meanwhile builds on the imaginary of probable those implausible things that are suitable in 
their system (Garcés, 2002): a colonization of a planet (which is nowadays nothing more than 
science fiction) has more sense than a radical change on our economy and society. This 
common sense then, may be a nonsense. 
Regarding nonsenses, David Harvey, a British geographer and Marxist theorist, in his article 
The right to the city (Harvey, 2008), analyses how capitalist economies require the destruction 
or assimilation of capital surplus to avoid its possible devaluation and crisis; they also need the 
expansion of markets, and the constant discovery of natural resources. He conceives the 
urbanization processes of the Second Empire Paris by Haussmann and the 1960s’ New York 
by Robert Moses as ways of creative destruction of capital. Another important way of 
accomplishing this – Harvey says – is through war: 
Paris became “the city of light” the great center of consumption, tourism and pleasure - the cafés, 
the department stores, the fashion industry, the grand expositions all changed the urban way of life 
in ways that could absorb vast surpluses through crass and frivolous consumerism (that offended 
traditionalists and excluded workers alike). But then the overextended and increasingly speculative 
financial system and credit structures on which this was based crashed in 1868. Haussmann was 
forced from power, Napoleon III in desperation went to war against Bismarck’s Germany and lost, 
and in the vacuum that followed arose the Paris Commune, one of the greatest revolutionary 
episodes in capitalist urban history. (Harvey, 2008: 26) 
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We see now how overproduction leads to crisis whenever the surplus capital cannot be 
destroyed or absorbed through the conventional mechanisms of our economy. I think we can 
analogize David Harveys’ thought to the so called spatial conquest in these three aspects: it 
absorbs overproduction capital (as these programmes require massive amounts of public 
money), they are also the perfect symbol of the expansion of markets (terrestrial and extra-
terrestrial) and in this sense, they enable the discovery of new natural resources. I am not trying 
to say here that these are the only purposes of spatial exploration, as the scientific research one 
remains true and maybe it is the major one, but I also consider rather naive to dismiss the fact 
that these spatial exploration programmes must have economic interests in mind and to think 
in terms of an ideal uninterested scientific research projects.  
However, what I am reviewing here is the argument that we need to explore space because, on 
Earth, there is now (or will be soon) a lack of resources. Because, how can there be a lack of 
resources if multiple crisis have been produced and are being produced –sustains Harvey – by 
the impossibility to absorb all this surplus capital? And even if there was an actual lack of 
resources, which ones lack? I am certain that if it was food or water what was lacking, we 
would not be able to find now or in the near future a sustainable way of transporting them from 
outer space (wherever they are) to Earth. If there were required raw materials as rare minerals, 
iron or precious metals, which are not essential to our survival but required supplies to the 
viability of existing industries and the emergence of new ones, then the main argument (there 
is a lack of resources that potentially threatens our survival on Earth) is not any more feasible. 
We can conclude, then, that the problem is not a hypothetical lack of means on our planet but 
a political and economic system that demands destroying or absorbing surplus capital and, at 
the same time, calls for new natural resources and the expansion of its markets. This is not 
quite the same, and this is called to crash as this limitless economic system is embedded on a 
limited holistic ecological system, our planet, which is governed by entropic laws that are 
quintessentially different to the economic ones. This future clash between these two systems 
was analysed extensively in the Limits to growth by Donella H. Meadows and her team 
(Meadows et al., 1972); one of their conclusions was that there must be applied constraints to 
growth as it is not possible an endless growth in a bounded biosphere; if restrictions are not to 
be applied, the question is not if we are going to face a global crisis, but when. (Meadows et 
al., 1972: 183) 
Nevertheless, if we look closely, we will see that there is something that is indeed lacking and 
that though we increasingly require it more and more, we could not get it even if we had the 
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fastest spaceship. We have plenty of matters on Earth but, as some philosophers and social 
scientists have pointed out, this crisis – that forces us to anxiously explore distant galaxies 
looking for a new home – is a matter of time.  
3.2 A matter of time 
As I have been saying, we live in a limited planet. The Blue Marble, one of the first images of 
our planet from outer space, taken by the crew of the Apollo 17 spacecraft on 1972, became 
the symbol of a rising environmental activism during the 1970s: the Earth was seen for the first 
time as a fragile, exposed and remote planet within the vastness of space (Petsko, 2011). This 
limited planet is, as said before, ruled by different laws than the economic ones and, therefore, 
by different temporalities as well. In this section I will follow the arguments made by the 
Spanish philosopher Jorge Riechmann in his book Gente que no quiere viajar a Marte 
(Riechmann, 2004), in order to explain why this crisis cannot be solved by adding more matter 
to Earth, or even by abandoning it, but – among others – by formulating radical changes to our 
liveable time, now identified with the time of production, which comes across – in some ways 
–to a physical-chronological time, born with Newton and the invention of the mechanical clock, 
and mostly dissociated from natural cycles. (Riechmann, 2004: 197) 
Riechmann identifies four distinct temporalities that are not coordinated nor governed in the 
industrialized societies: (1) the time of the body, based on biological-circadian rhythms; (2) the 
time of nature, based on regeneration cycles such as seasons, animal migrations or the 
oscillation between the number of prey and hunters; (3) the time of social life, of otium as 
opposed to neg-otium, which includes freely meeting with others and political action or cultural 
activities inter alia;  and finally (4) the time of the industrial and financial system, this is the 
abstract, homogeneous and chronological time that we carry confined inside our clocks, which 
has become a unique global time, accelerating itself with the emergence of the digital data and 
thus destroying traditional times such as day or night. (Riechmann, 2004: 202) 
Nowadays one of our most significant problems is this clash of temporalities. Each clash 
corresponding to a major crisis, for example, the subordination of the time of body and social 
life to the time of the industrial and financial system turns out to be a care’s crisis, which can 
be analysed from various perspectives: class, gender, ecology, etc. These times are colliding 
with the time of nature too. The crisis of care we are living has a deep ecological impact in the 
current context of cheap oil: households are now consuming – and polluting– more than ever 
(up to three times more than in the 1990s) but at the same time we see women working more 
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than their previous generation while men’s work has almost not been increased (D’Alisa & 
Cattaneo, 2010). 
Regarding the clash between the temporality of nature and that of the industrial and financial 
system, we see, in Riechmann words, how “the long times of our biosphere, with its 
equilibriums and transformations, collide against the “global time” of financial markets, 
cyberspace and telecommunications”  (Riechmann, 2004: 203).  As Riechmann points out, one 
of the first academics to theorize about this collision of times was Enzo Tiezzi, an Italian 
scholar, politic, and environmentalist, who identified this global time of instrumental 
rationality as opposed to the natural time (Tiezzi, 1990: 65). The natural temporality, which 
was described before as regenerative and cyclic, is ruled by entropy laws: in simpler words, as 
our bodies cells die gradually and locally to renew itself and therefore live more time, the Earth 
does the same; we cannot speak about a constant production but about a re-production. If we 
do not respect these re-production paces what we are doing is destroying and not simply 
producing or consuming resources.  
Two examples Riechmann uses, and which I consider very clarifying, are the rate of production 
and consumption of fossil fuels and the loss of biodiversity our planet is suffering from. On 
one hand, we have fossil fuels that required around three-hundred million years to be produced, 
and which we have extracted almost completely in two hundred years: a million times faster. 
If we slowed down one million times our rate of consumption of fossil fuels we could consider 
them renewable sources of energy, as nature would re-produce them, but that is not very likely 
to happen. On the other hand, biodiversity is not something given we are losing now: 
biodiversity is self-re-produced at a very slow pace; Tim Ingold, a British anthropologist, calls 
this re-generation of difference ontogenesis (Ingold, 2011): an inclusive differentiation process 
instead of the so-called process of diversification of Nature. This biodiversity, a key element 
to our survival, is being devastated so fast that recent studies alert that if we do not reduce the 
destruction of wild habitats and stop the increasing temperatures we will have as many as the 
thirty to fifty percent of species headed to extinction by mid-century (Thomas et al., 2004). 
To conclude, our problems on Earth cannot be solved by abandoning it and looking for a new 
home, neither by acquiring more resources from outer space. The argument used that spatial 
exploration is a survival issue – which is based in a space-time confusion– cannot be sustained 
as long as it is grounded on Earth’s false lack of resources or its human-caused degradation. 
As I said before, an exception would be made only on those extra-terrestrial threats (such as 
solar flares and meteorite collisions) that require further investigation.  We have seen that our 
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crisis is not a resource crisis but a global crisis with multiple dimensions which require a deep 
thought and a radical swift in some essential concepts such as time, limits and regeneration, 
but most importantly nature itself.  
We cannot import time from space, but we sure can steal it from future generations: and this is 
exactly what we are doing in order to sustain our economic and social systems, and thus our 
ways of life embedded on them. I suggest this should be called temporal extractivism: when 
facing the solidity in the walls of time, we: the human species, try to evade ourselves through 
the cracks of a space with no limits, not even caring that this space is essentially void. And, as 
we cannot get rid of time, we decide to dispose our limited space: the same space that supports 
life, joy and, of course, death and sorrow. I think we could compare this attitude to the figure 
of the ascetic that torments and sacrifices its own body (unique and singular) so as to achieve 
the eternity in some heaven invisible to the naked eye. But, maybe, we can also try to think 
once more our planet as what Nietzsche said about the human being in Schopenhauer as 
Educator and make an effort to formulate new answers:  
In his heart every man knows quite well that, being unique, he will be in the world only once 
and that no imaginable chance will for a second time gather together into a unity so strangely 
variegated an assortment as he is: he knows it but he hides it like a bad conscience - why? 
(Nietzsche, 1876: 127) 
 
4. Our relationship with nature. The roots of the ethical problem. 
The embryonic abandonment of Earth, as we have seen, responds to a lot of causes and not 
only to the immediate or long-term survival of our species. This possible exodus we have been 
discussing about is both physical: its outcome is a colonization of other planets, and 
psychological: when we admit that there is no other way but to depredate the resources of our 
home planet, and look for new ones that may sustain human life, we are abandoning it by our 
own actions. This abandonment is the same as neglecting our planet: we do not care anymore, 
and therefore, we do not dwell in the Earth but use it.  
We said in the beginning of this dissertation that the problem of outer space is not only 
scientific, but ethical and political as well. The consequences of our current relationship with 
our natural environment are one of the main causes we want to escape from Earth even though 
we do not really know where we should escape to. It is needless to say that the values we confer 
to the environment play an important role in our relationship with it. As a matter of fact, in the 
scientific research of outer space we have described before it is not the life on Earth or Earth 
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itself we want to save – these may not be valuable enough – but human life alone. When talking 
about colonizing other planets or exploiting their resources we are understanding nature as a 
resource which can be used whenever we want to. These ethical problems we have mentioned 
before: the resource problem and the matter of time, are both embedded in the same conception 
of nature which makes plausible a human quest to space but, at the same time, labels as 
unthinkable an economy not based on growth.  
The conception of nature as a resource is a topic some philosophers have actually been working 
on for decades. We see examples in the Dialectic of Enlightenment by the Frankfurt School 
philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, likewise in the works of some Deep 
Ecology movement authors like Arne Næss and George Sessions, and in the later works of the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger (Building Dwelling Thinking, The Question concerning 
Technology or Serenity). If we believe that this comprehension of nature is one of the central  
issues of the ethical problems we find in the research of outer space, I think there is a need to 
make clear that an ontological swift, or a collective transformation of our own comprehension 
of nature, is necessary to confront this problem. In the following section I will develop on the 
conceptions of nature we find in Heidegger’s thought and I will comment on the possible 
answers given by some philosophers to a more respectful and caring relationship with our 
environment and, therefore, conceive our planet not as a disposable resource but the home it 
actually is.  
4.1 The concept of nature as a resource 
In this part, I will assume and develop the consequences of the idea that our conception of 
Nature – the way we understand it and the values we recognize in it– has a crucial relevance in 
the ethical problems we find in our relationship with outer space. Our own contemporary 
concept of Nature was analysed deeply by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who 
affirmed that there are at least five ways –historically set– to understand nature: (1) nature as 
Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand), (2) as a subjacent essence, (3) as life that emerges from 
itself, (4) as a physical matter on Earth and (5) as a cosmic home (Lack, 2014: 94). In this 
dissertation I will focus on the first one to consider if there is a link between this dimension of 
Nature as presence-at-hand and the current intention to abandon Earth.  
In the Question concerning Technology (Heidegger, 1954) Heidegger sustains that this 
dimension of Nature is revealed as the one and only truth expressed by modern technology. In 
contrast with the handicraft and non-modern techniques which are more related to the Greek 
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póisesis and emerging from itself conception, the revealing we see nowadays, through the 
lenses of the modern technology –says Heidegger– is a “challenging [Herausfordern], which 
puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply [sic] energy that can be extracted and 
stored as such” (Heidegger, 1954: 14).  Here Heidegger does not say we should weave our own 
clothes again, but that the modern technology makes us conceive nature in such a way that 
other possible –and more authentic– disclosures may be left hidden in the dark. We see more 
clearly this comprehension in the following fragment:  
What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that which comes to stand forth 
through this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. 
Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve 
[Bestand]. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere 
"stock." The name "standing-reserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates 
nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging 
revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us 
as object. (Heidegger, 1954: 17) 
We see how the way we currently understand nature: as this standing-reserve that must be 
stored in such a way so that it may be “on call for a further ordering”, relates to the one we use 
when discussing about outer space and our planet. The reification of the Earth –or nature– that 
is produced when we scrutinize the night sky looking for new planets to inhabit (as ours has 
not enough resources) primarily corresponds to the disclosure of Nature as an enframed 
standing-reserve that is both replaceable and valuable only for its position in mechanical 
systems like the social and economic ones. The Earth and its limits become something that 
must be taken into account but not essentially cared about: they are revealed as functional 
elements and not the main boundaries of the economic and technological modes of organizing 
ourselves as a society.  
There is no discussion that nature might possess an economic and social value in some 
worldviews. At least, this is not the argument I am sustaining here when using this analysis of 
our comprehension of nature. The question that is important here is not whether nature has 
economic value or not, but if its main value should be the functional one. My intuition is that, 
if we find ourselves prepared to assert this, then we should re-examine the idea of nature we 
hold. Such a conception –as we have already seen– is related to our economic and political 
systems as well: when our ways of living are organized in such a way that we consume nature 
as a standing-reserve, it is obvious that the easiest way of maintaining them is to increase this 
storage which is commutative and can be easily substituted. We can momentarily grasp here 
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that the same operation that reveals the land as a coal mine (Heidegger, 1954: 14), or our food 
as caloric and nutritional input, uncovers the Earth as a spherical container of resources 
stockpiled waiting to be used, permanently present-at-hand, so that our current economic 
system– based on material growth and consumerism – does not change.  
This hegemonic disclosure of Nature – Heidegger alerts – precludes other revelations, perhaps 
more authentic and original. We will not positively discuss here which ones should be taken 
into consideration when radically asking ourselves about Nature as the way modern technology 
uncovers it is something which according to Heidegger we cannot deliberately change: the 
essence of technology is not entirely human. Nevertheless, asking ourselves about its essence 
may save us (and the Earth) from the world this revelation is taking us to: “when asking 
ourselves about the technology we proceed towards its comprehension and we found ourselves, 
and the truth. Here, asking saves because it opens, it breaks totalities, dogmatisms and 
everydayness” (Esquirol, 2009: 101). We can conclude, then, that our mode to comprehend 
Nature –– which is not an individual standpoint or worldview– is something we must ask 
ourselves about radically if we want to solve these outer space ethical problems without 
abandoning Earth: when we start asking ourselves we are –at the same time– taking care, and 
not into account. 
4.2 A different approach to nature 
In the last section I developed on how asking ourselves about our own concept of Nature, even 
if we do not have a definite answer, contributes to partially solve the problem of outer space. 
We must bear in mind, but, that despite not having a solution that might solve all the problems, 
there is a growing need for new philosophical and ethical propositions that help us understand 
better our relationship with our planet. These new proposals –as we have already seen– cannot 
be scientific alone, as the problem is not merely scientific, but should be sustained by scientific 
evidence when necessary: an ethical and political approach to our relationship with the planet 
that does not take into consideration the reality of climate change, the loss of biodiversity or 
the acidification of the oceans: all in all, the anthropogenic destruction we are responsible for, 
may be hiding rather than revealing new ways of living and thinking more sustainably.  
In the last few decades, since the beginning of the ecological movement in the later sixties, we 
have seen a lot of proposals trying to establish a new mode of thinking and relating ourselves 
and our activities with the environment, usually in a more respectful and limited manner. 
Ecofeminism or the Deep Ecology movement, for example, partook in an important intellectual 
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effort to change our relationship with nature in both theory and praxis. However, this effort is 
not historically located and terminated: we are nowadays still discovering new ways of 
understanding the Earth and nature, from the degrowth movement to the dark ecology proposal 
by Timothy Morton, which considers obsolete the distinction between artificial and natural 
(Jiménez, 2016).  Even Yves Charles Zarka, a Tunisian philosopher from la Sorbonne 
Université Paris Descartes, who has tried –among other intellectual works– to formulate and 
give substance to a new ethical and political cosmopolitanism, published in 2013 an essay titled 
L'inappropriabilité de la Terre: Principe d'une refondation philosophique  where he defends 
that when destroying the Earth, the human species is destroying itself as well (Zarka, 2014).  
These proposals, though diverse and very different from each other, have something in 
common: while a few ones may be supporting ecocentrism or biocentrism and others may still 
be defending the predominance of human interests above others’, they all coincide on the 
necessity of setting limits on these interests and their footprint in the world. The degrowth 
strategy, for example, through sharing and narrowing the productive activities, establishes a 
biological limit to the economic system; in the other hand, we see that the Platform of Deep 
Ecology states in its fourth point that “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible 
with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires 
such a decrease.” (Devall, 2001: 23).  
As we see, limits to the increased human interference with the natural world are an essential 
characteristic we must locate in any serious ethical answer to the abandonment of Earth. 
Nevertheless, this limited attitude towards our environment is not something that was born in 
the later sixties nor a character that should be built today; in fact, this approach to nature has 
been dwelling in philosophy for a lot of time: we find it, for example, in the works of 
philosophers like Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David Thoreau. Thoreau’s writings, for 
instance, despite having been written in the beginnings of the industrialization of North 
America, have a lot in common with some of the principles we can see nowadays in the 
Platform of Deep Ecology or in the rewilding proposal by George Monbiot (Monbiot, 2013). 
We discover in Thoreau’s work an ahead-of-his-time deep critique of the industrial society 
values we currently live by: though years have passed, his thought remains –in this aspect– 
fully valid today. Thoreau believed that the industrial civilization would lead people to a 
tripartite alienation: man and nature, man and others, and man and himself (Ma, 2009: 388). 
The human being in this industrial civilization –according to Thoreau– had started to see nature 
as a source of economic benefit and recreational value alone and had forgotten to breathe its 
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actual scent. We see in some of his views something that the Frankfurt School would work on 
a century later: 
By avarice and selfishness, and a grovelling habit, from which none of us is free, of regarding 
the soil as property, or the means of acquiring property chiefly, the landscape is deformed, 
husbandry is degraded with us, and the farmer leads the meanest of lives. He knows Nature but 
as a robber. (Thoreau, 1854: 165) 
In Thoreau’s critique to the current instrumental way of conceiving Nature we see one of the 
seeds that would eventually grow to be the forest that shades and gives shelter to a lot of the 
ethical, political and ontological proposals we have gone through in this last section. The 
defence of nature that some of these propositions share, can be understood as a commitment 
and a compromise to conserve the wild side of the world, so that we can relate to it in a more 
humble and non-dominant manner. These approaches have nothing in common with those 
conservative ideologies that try to go back to an ideal and rural past –rooted in the protection 
of both the small community and the national state– but with all those movements that fight 
against the political, economic and cultural forces that disaggregate and weaken our 
relationship with nature, others and ourselves. We consider that this conservation of Nature 
should be regarded as a resistance and not as a return: when we resist, we take a stand against 
something, we set limits to the outreach of our cultural, economic and political systems in such 
a way that we can co-exist and permit the flourishing of nature, others and ourselves. On the 
other hand, returning is most of the time a failed pathway: the eyes that look back may be 
turned into salt. This genuine co-existence –or letting things be– we discover and treasure not 
only in Thoreau’s works, but in a wide range of both old and new philosophies, can only work 
when embedded in a self-limited mode of living, acting and thinking: as individuals and as a 
society living on a bounded planet. The abandonment of Earth apparently seems to vanish when 
its limits –as they were what we were escaping from– are not only honoured, but fused with 
our lives, actions and thoughts.  
5. Conclusions  
Outer space is a vast place much devoid of life as far as we know. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, it is a field of opportunities for science and mankind. Our relationship with it –as we have 
seen– is not a neutral one: as it strongly responds to our ethical, cultural and political principles 
and concepts. In the beginning of this work, I explained how a genuine ethics of outer space is 
needed to understand the implications of our own limited actions in the limitlessness of the 
cosmos, and how an ethics of the scientific research of space is indispensable if we want to 
understand the methods and beneficiaries of this research. Both ethical theories complement 
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each other, but concurrently, they are blind in their actions if they do not ask first the motives 
of this research: what do we see in outer space? Knowledge or a way out?   
Whereas scientific knowledge of outer space is something we should never neglect, when its 
origin and destination are both the abandonment of Earth –first psychologically and finally 
physically– we must take a closer look and examine its motives and defences. As shown before 
in the ethics of the scientific research of outer space section, this survival or salvation discourse 
–which sometimes resembles the religious one– is used to justify some of these scientific 
investigations. This discourse is based on the solution of social problems by scientific methods, 
as it confuses the scientific problems with those that are social, ethical and political, as said in 
the resource problem section. We must overcome this discourse and try to build a different 
one, because “if we would survive and preserve both our natural heritage and our own 
humanity, we must at last discover how to solve, by social means, the social evils that threaten 
both” (Commoner, 1973). 
A distinctive approach to answer our social difficulties – as the one of the lack of resources or 
the matter of time– requires a thought that not only wants to resolve the effects that our political, 
economic, and cultural systems are responsible for, but that also tries to modify the conceptions 
that sustain these systems as well. In this article, I have tried to synthesize a critique to the 
contemporary conception of nature as a standing reserve, and show some alternative proposals 
that are both old and new from a philosophical perspective. A different conception of nature, 
though, is not enough: in order to return to a more honest research of outer space, we must also 
try to build different concepts of progress – dissociated from the scientific and technological 
one–, and knowledge, among others.  
To sum up, in this article we have seen how outer space is not only a scientific object, but a 
place where present and future, human and nature, meet in such a manner that when there is 
the first, the latter disappears. This is not the end of the railway: outer space is not determined 
to be our future home no matter we do. In fact, what we do, and the way we do it, is not only 
important, but essential if we want to see the sky, once again, as the starry roof of our unique 
home, and not as the dusty graveyard of the human species– and those we sweep away with us 
too. We may not need an apocalyptic discourse that leads to inaction, nor an optimism that 
once again states that this world we dwell in is the best of the possible ones: we can live, 
temporarily, in an in-between: a refuge to act locally, while we think again our planet and its 
future, so that our problems can be responded once again with the power of our own words 
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and not by the inertia of others’. As René Dubos wrote in his book Celebrations of life (Dubos, 
1981): 
The human beings have always been and are creative because they are capable of integrating 
the pessimism of the intelligence with the optimism of the will […]. 
In the course of history and prehistory, we have enjoyed the freedom to choose our pathway, to 
change the direction, and even to walk again our steps to achieve goals we have proposed 
ourselves. The determinist future operates in human life as in other forms of life; but it has been 
continuously and increasingly complemented by the desired future based on values and human 
aspirations.  
Like other human beings at all stages of prehistory and history, we are still on the way. We 
constantly renew ourselves by moving on, to new places and new experiences. Wherever human 
beings are involved, trend is never destiny because life starts anew, for them, with each sunrise. 
Demain, tout recommence (Dubos, 1981: 253). 
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